#846 Michela Massimi: Perspectival Realism

00:00 Ricardo Lopes: Hello everybody. Welcome to a new episode of the Center. I'm your host as always Ricardo Loops. And today I'm joined by Dr Mia Massimi. She is Professor of Philosophy of Science in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, affiliated with the Higgs Center for Theoretical Physics. She works in the area of history and Philosophy of Science with the focus on the physical sciences. And today we are focusing on her book Perspective of Realism, which by the way, just recently won the 2023 Lacas awards. So Dr Massimi, welcome to the show. It's a big pleasure to everyone.

00:39 Michela Massimi: Thank you so much for having me Ricardo to be here.

00:43 Ricardo Lopes: OK. So to get into the book, I would like to start by asking you this. So what is realism in science? And by the way, uh when, when I mean, realism is, are there different kinds of realism or not?

01:01 Michela Massimi: Sure. Yeah. So um what we call realism in philosophy of science is really um a broad um family of views um that normally are characterized by um series of commitments um that um are distinctive of what we would like to think of a realist position. Now, uh what those commitments are obviously um are fairly well understood, but also change in a very subtle way depending on which specific variety of realism one is willing to subscribe to. Um So I would say that what defines realism are two main commitments. Uh One is the idea that there is uh uh uh uh some relationship between science and um nature that is usually captured by the notion of truth. Um And the other is that there has to be some kind of representational relation between how science and scientific theory, scientific models relate to the target system. So if you ask me, I would say um realism is defined by those two broad notions of truth and representation. Now, obviously, we may disagree about what we mean by truth. We may disagree slightly about what we mean by representation, how models represent reality. Um So, depending on how different philosophers characterize those notions, you may get different varieties of realism. Um So, over really the past uh 40 50 years, there has been a proliferation of views that call themselves or style themselves as realist view. Um Some of them are um redefining some of those notions of truth. So you have variety of pragmatic realism or internal realism. Um Others are rethinking the exact nature of the relationship between science and nature um uh in terms of representation. So you have varieties of selective realism, for example, that um endorse the presentational commitment, but they would be selective about which aspects of reality the model is committed to represent. So very broadly, truth and representation are the two key commitments. Uh And within the broad umbrella, there is a, a full spectrum of views that may slightly differ in how they understand those two notions and how those two notions enter into um our way of thinking about science and, and reality

03:49 Ricardo Lopes: and related to that, what would an anti realist stance in science entail?

03:57 Michela Massimi: So, um going back to this idea that, you know, truth and representations are some of the two key commitments. Um uh ANTI realist view views and plural can be characterized by uh playing down some of those um notions. So for example, you find the varieties of instrumentalist views, they are anti realist views because they are not committed to the notion that um uh truth is any important element in the way in which we think about the relation between science and reality. Um You get varieties of constructivism um that likewise uh would challenge the idea that uh representation really plays an important role in how models latch onto, onto the world on the realities. Um So there's a broad spectrum of views really going back to um 1980 the scientific image of Basman Pras. And um that has been a landmark book for a constructive empiricism. Um It's a classic example of an anterial view where um the notion of truth is replaced by notion of empirical adequacy, for example. So according to a fra and die of science is not to deliver um theories, they are approximately true but to deliver theories, they are pi adequate. Um TWO more recently varieties of epistemological constructivism. So, um Mike Boone um building on the process and defense form a form of constructivism and um how she conceptualizes the relationship between models and reality. Um So this is just an example, but obviously the family is much broader than that.

05:54 Ricardo Lopes: And what is a scientific perspective?

06:00 Michela Massimi: Um So it's a great question, what is STV perspective? So the term um has a bit of an history. Um The way I've been using it in my book um really has a um a predecessor. The closest predecessor is in Ron's uh book on scientific perspective is uh the way Ron Giri originally defined the notion of a scientific perspective was really in analogy uh with Thomas Coon's notion of a disciplinary matrix. So disciplinary matrix is a um a slightly more refined notion of uh probably the more familiar notion of S and TV paradigm um in the sense that it indicates uh a family of um practices and commitments that particular community has at a particular historical time. The way in which Rangiri originally defined the Oslo scientific perspective in, in, in the book was really in terms of families or models. So Rangiri was building on a long standing tradition, going back to Patrick Sap in the 19 sixties onwards, um whereby uh we need to think of scientific theories as, as families or models. Uh STARTING with high level models, uh representational models, going all the way down to um models of the experiment, data model and so forth. What I do in the book is to slightly move away from Maroni's definition. Um Because I would like to think of a scientific perspective as something broader than just the family of models. So for me, a scientific perspective is the historically and culturally situated practice of particular communities, a particular historical time. And I understand really this notion of practice in a very, very broad sense um um to include varieties of knowledge that um may not necessarily have well defined formalized modeling practices. Um So broadly speaking, a scientific perspective is a, is a historically situated practice of a community. And um here I borrow on the literature in epistemology. Um THERE'S been again, a very important literature on perspective is coming from epistemology and Aaron Sosa in particular knowledge in perspective uh book uh from which I'm drawing in thinking that really what SN TV perspective does is not just to um advance um a series of claims of knowledge, but also provide the um experimental theoretical and technological tools for reliably making those claims of knowledge as well as providing um methodological and epistemic principles that can justify the reliability of um of our uh uh uh uh practices for making those claims of knowledge. So it's kind of a a three fold distinction between the body of claims of knowledge, the experimental theoretical conceptual tools to reliably make them and the methodological epistemic principle that justify the reliability of those uh of those tools. And that's the, the, the very broad way in which I've been using the term in the book.

09:27 Ricardo Lopes: And what about a perspective of realism? What does it mean exactly? And what flavor of realism applies to it?

09:38 Michela Massimi: So, um yeah, that's a great question. Going back to the original question about varieties of realism and family of realism. Um I'd like to think of prospect our realism as a view that is committed to the notion of truth as correspondence and the idea that um our theories, our models especially uh represent reality. So it's a realist view. But the way I present the view in the book is that it, it's not a metaphysics first uh view about realism. So very often what you find is that realism is defined by uh metaphysics first approaches. So if someone declared themselves a realist, what they really mean is that they are committed to spelling out to what the metaphysical building blocks of nature are or they are committed to um tell a story about uh what the metaphysical foundations of reality are. And the metaphysical story typically involves um different flavors of metaphysics. So some people are committed to natural properties others are committed to the there are dispositions um or other people believe in causal powers. Um PER the realism is not a metaphysics first approach in the sense that although there is a metaphysical part, uh which is the second part of the book, um the primary aim is really um trying to uh uh in a way show how that metaphysical commitment is really downstream to an epistemological project. So what really matters to me is to trying to understand how we produce reliable knowledge over time and how a plurality of historical and cultural situated perspectives um are able to uh deliver that reliable knowledge over time. So um I see realism not so much as uh um an exercise in trying to uh unveil the metaphysical building block of nature, but I see metaphysics as the downstream outcome of how we tell a story about how we produce reliable knowledge over time. So there is a metaphysical part. So ultimately, spec of realism is realism about phenomena about modally robust phenomenon. And that obviously involves really finding the very notion of phenomena that has a long philosophical history. And it's, it's, it's part of what they're doing in the second part of the book. So if you ask me, what kind of flavor is perspective, a realism, it's really realism about moderate robust phenomena. Um But as I said, I see that metaphysical commitment as, as the outcome of uh um uh a more important exercise, which is trying to understand how um different communities over time and culture produce reliable knowledge over time.

12:44 Ricardo Lopes: But then where is, where exactly is the perspective, all nature in scientific representation?

12:52 Michela Massimi: So, yeah, what that perspective is enters into the story of how we produce reliable knowledge, right? So um I can think of a plurality of communities that are historical and cultural situated, different historical periods, different cultures and so forth. Can we tell a story about how that knowledge is produced a across these different communities? And how is that story going to look like? Um So one thing I definitely wanted to do in the book is to avoid any um standard template that you find in the literature on realism about realism of being some kind of convergence to a reality that um in a way we all agree upon. Um There is no convergence in perspective of realism. Um The way I use often this metaphor in the book taken for um the, the o Borges at the Garden of Forking Path, they are uh producing knowledge is a bit like going through a garden of forking path and kind of zigzagging where at each juncture, we have to make a choice about which path we want to go down. So there is no uh or underlying picture, the realism is a convergence to because really it's a realism about phenomena, there's no realism about any fundamental metaphysical reality, as I said, the cause of powers, dispositional essence is that we want to call it. Um So those phenomena are encountered by different communities across different periods and across different cultures um in a reliable way or in a way that we are able to uh uh to see how their situated practices intersect with one another. So this is where the perspective that comes in, right? Because traditionally, um the very idea that the starting point of conversations about realism um is, is, is, is is human beings in their plurality and historically and cultural situated, this has appeared to be a stumbling block to any realist project. How could one ever possibly defend realism, especially about science? Once we take really seriously that there is a plurality of um historically situated communities and their culture. So that was the starting point of my um kind of journey uh for the book. Um I went back to the notion of representation. I said at the beginning through the representations are the two key commitment of any realist view. And I wanted to understand what makes some representations pers respectable and whether there is a way of reconciling the perspective of representation with realism. Um So at the very beginning of the book, I go back to the analogy between art and science and that has been well explored since the time of, well, it's a long story, long tradition really. Uh BUT more recently, Basra and 2008 book on a scientific representation, paradoxes of perspectives has been a very influential uh book for uh for my own personal journey, but also Kathrine Elgin uh 2017 book. Uh True Enough, uh is also very important for discussing the perspective nature of representation. And so really thinking about the analogy between art and science, what makes some representation perspect? Traditionally, we tend to think of that uh question in terms of the representation is situated is from a particular vantage point. So um a drawing, a perspective drawing is what makes the drawing perspective is that the scene is painted from a particular angle. And obviously, the angle means that there are other aspects of the scene that we can't really see uh from that particular angle. So there is an element of lusion and there is what Vansen called um a horizon of alternatives. We could have chosen to represent the scene from different angles and we could have chosen to represent the object with different attributes. Um So the story I turn in chapter two and three of the book, which is really the beginning of the of the book is that very often that specific way of thinking about perspective of representation um has been um regarded as a as a, as a difficulty for any realism or a realist project. Um Precisely because if the representation is situated is from a particular angle, how can we ever be in a position of saying what the real nature of the object is, our knowledge is always partially occluded and, and, and, and not complete. Um So the story I tell is that, well, actually, if you look at the nature of perspective and drawing in art, um there are two ways of thinking about perspective, um a representation is perspective, not only because it's drawn from a particular angle, but because it's also drawn towards one or more vantage point. Actually, technically, this is the definition of a perspect uh representation that um there is one or more vantage point towards which lines converge. And that's what creates the optical illusion that you can see a three dimensional space on what effectively is a two dimensional canvas. Um And, and so I play with that metaphor in art to say, well, really, those are two aspects of the same coin really, you know, you the representation is perspect as drawn from a particular vantage point only in so far as there is one or more vantage points that allows us to create this, this these windows of reality, uh this, this three dimensional space emerging out of a two dimensional canvas. And so that's my entry point for the idea that there is a way of telling a story about realism starting with the situated nature of the representation.

18:56 Ricardo Lopes: So tell us now about the notion of pluralism. Where is it and how does it apply to science?

19:05 Michela Massimi: Yeah. So pluralism is really uh again, a big family of views. Uh I'm drawing really here on a long standing tradition that has emphasized the importance of pluralism in science. Um EXPLANATORY pluralism and methodological pluralism uh tradition. Going back to Ellen Longino and uh Carol, a fair and Miriam Solomon and Sandra Mitchell, integrity, pluralism. Obviously, John Dupre promiscuous realism and many, many, many others. Um THE kind of pluralism um that matters to my story is again, perspect about pluralism is pluralism of perspectives as I have defined it. Uh So my emphasis is not so much on um explanatory methodological or ontological pluralism. It's really pluralism about uh uh historically, cult is the practices. It's, it's a fact that science is the outcome of this plurality of perspectives and communities that have endorsed different practices. Um And then obviously, then the question becomes OK. Um As I was just saying with the problem of perspective or representation is pers sorry, representation from a point of view, representation uh uh towards one or more vantage point, the question is OK, if you take the pluralism as a fact about science, what kind of uh realism emerges out of that, can we even talk about realism or should we just say that we are um confined to a plurality of um ways of knowing they are distinctive of different communities and their practices? Um But we can't really attempt to tell a story about science and scientific knowledge and, and realism about science and the best that we can do is this plurality of scientific practices. So, what I do in the book is to say, no, no, no. We, we can take the pluralism, perspect of pluralism as a starting point. It's a fact about science. The science is produced in that way. But that doesn't mean that we need to end up with some kind of instrumentalist or anti realist view. There's still a way of defending realism in science. Um STARTING with perspect about pluralism.

21:34 Ricardo Lopes: Mhm And so another thing that you tackle in your book is the problem of inconsistent model. So what is that problem really about and can perspective is help us tackle it?

21:49 Michela Massimi: Yeah. So kind of zooming into uh this problem of how to reconcile um Perspect about pluralism as pluralism of perspectives and, and realism. The problem in consistent models uh is, is, is one of, is one of the major problem for any perspective is um because this is where we the pluralism um appears to be somehow at odds with any realist claim. Um So it's a problem that was really brought to the general attention um maybe 13 years ago uh roughly uh by uh Mary Morrison um in a, in a beautiful paper where she discusses the plurality of models in some areas of science. So she says, well, look at nuclear physics, right? Um So the areas of science where there is one model, we all agree more or less that uh you know, it is the um best model to describe some kind of phenomena. But there are other areas where there seems to be a pluralism, a kind of endemic pluralism and as, as pluralism of models. So the example of Morrison is that if you look at nuclear physics, and if you ask the question about what is the atomic nucleus, um you find different answers to the question depending on whether we are studying a nuclear fission. In which case, we represent the nucleus as if it was a liquid of incompressible nuclear fluid. Uh But if we are studying um stellar nucleus synthesis, we use different families of models, the cluster model whereby the atomic nucleus is represented as a tetrahedron with a particular structures of problems and neutrons. And obviously, if we're studying other phenomena in high energy physics, we use yet another class of models. We use the quark models to describe what happens when we smash protons to say at LHC. So Morrison Point was, well, if we have this pluralism of models, does it even make sense to ask what is the atomic nucleus? I mean, w where is the realism there? Right? I mean, we have different stories about what the nucleus is. Um IS there one which is the best one? And if, if there is, then what about the others? Isn't it better to adopt some kind of instrumental is um perspective is, has often been accused of being a form of instrumental is so um Morrison uh argument in that paper that has also been rested by other philosophers like an Chakravorti, for example, in um in, in, in, in, in his book on um the the kind of metaphysics of nature is that very often perspective is, doesn't live up to the promise of realism because it looks like uh what we really mean by perspective is is the representation is drawn from a particular point of view. So if you look at the nucleus from the point of view of um fission, then it looks like a liquid drop. But if you look at the nucleus from the point of view of stellar nucleus synthesis, then it looks like a tetrad. And I think it's that way of thinking about perspective is that has really um meant that perspective is for a long time as has been regarded as kind of no much for realism. Um So I tackled the problem of inconsistent models in chapter three of the book. And um I show that the problem is not really a problem for perspective is in so far as we are clear about um some hidden assumptions that seems to be creeping into the argument. And so some of those assumptions are uh in my view are, are really um kind of very demanding and unduly stringent realist assumption that seems to assume that models represent by mapping 1 to 1 aspects of the model with aspects of the target system. And that seems to understand the notion of truth going back to representation of truth in terms of uh truth maker. So there has to be a ontological state of affairs in terms of ascription of essential properties to particular that make some claims of knowledge true. And now if one endorses that view about truth, the truth makers and representation as mapping, I think Morrison has a point that this plurality of model seems to be a problem for, for realism, we can't think of the nucleus as having inconsistent or incompatible essential properties. Um But what I do in chapter three of the book is to resist that assumption and saying, uh why, why do we need to buy into representation as mapping or what do we need to buy into truth as truth maker? Maybe there is a different way of thinking about what models do and how they represent from a perspective or point of view that doesn't necessarily land us into this um uh quo of inconsistent essential properties ascribed to the same target system. And so it's a very important problem because it's really um the starting point of a way of reconciling realism or perspective is

27:10 Ricardo Lopes: and uh related to perspective modeling and perspective of models. Um What do you mean by them being blueprints on reality as you say in the book? And uh perhaps related to these, how do the concepts of conceivability and possibility enter into it.

27:33 Michela Massimi: Yeah. So um what I do from chapter four or five onwards is to spell out the positive story, right? And not just to say, we need to resist all this assumption and duly stringent assumption. So um a different way of thinking about what models do is to tell a different story about how to represent their target system without ascribing essential properties to the target system. So in that context that develop the view that models really are inferential blueprints, so they are blueprints that allows different communities. And again, think of a plurality of historical and cultural situated communities to draw inferences about relevant model, robust phenomena from a plurality of data set. So what the model does is not so much mapping 1 to 1 aspects of the model and aspects of reality. I think we have been very often in philosophy, science, we have this picture that models represent. But as if really the primary function of the model was to mirror a map onto the target system, right? But that idea seems very counterintuitive to me even I mean, think of well established model like the DN model of the nucleus, right. I mean, we don't, we don't use the model because we want to necessarily represent the nucleus, we use the model because we want to make inferences right about the that we want to study, we want to understand how DNA behaves, we want to understand how uh possible error in the um in the in the process of DNA uh uh chain of events may happen. So we, we want to ask those questions about what is possible about DNA replication and mistakes in the DNA replication. So think of models really as catering to this needs of allowing us to make uh uh relevant and appropriate inferences about phenomena that we want to study. So that's what the metaphor of inferential blueprint is. So models yes, do represent and do represent from a specific vantage point. That's why we have a plurality of models used by different communities. The primary function is not to ascribe essential properties to the target system. As the metaphysicians would like us to think of the primary function is to allow communities to make reliable, robust, relevant and appropriate inferences about those uh uh those phenomena that, that, that we want to study. And so again, I use the analogy very often as I do in the book between um uh uh uh perspective of representation in this case in architecture. So the idea of the inferential blueprints is borrowed from, from architecture because again, in, in, in, in architecture, you can have uh um a plurality of perspective or representation of say a house that allows different communities of the carpenter and the masons and the architects to work together and make inferences about how the house should be built. How tall should the roof be? What's the relationship between the height of the door and the height of the roof. Uh And so I use an analogy to say likewise, whenever we want to study specific phenomenon, that plurality of models allows these different communities to make those uh uh relevant and appropriate inferences about the objects so that we want to study. Um So they find in models as really catering to um the need of delivering knowledge about what is possible about the object under study. So, perspect modeling is modeling possibilities, modeling, how things could be. Um And it's, it's a way of answering those questions in a kind of very exploratory way where we have not just one community that can reclaim full ownership of the knowledge of the target system, but we need a plurality of communities that I illustrate with various case studies in the book. So I have one chapter on climate change. So climate modeling in the context of studying um uh global warming, one chapter on developmental psychology and one chapter on the nuclear physics where I show how in each case to study specific phenomena like the stability of some nuclear or difficulties with reading or global warming. We need a plurality of community. So if you want to study climate change and global warming, you need a plurality of people that model um increase in ocean heat temperature uh communities that model how glacier and permafrost are changing under the effect of greenhouse gasses. Communities that study corals and uh uh tree rings. So then thema again to make inferences from those data to the phenomena under study. And so it's through that plurality of modeling practices and, and communities that we come to know very complex and multifactorial phenomena like um global warming, for example. So that that's how I use the analogy with models as inferential blueprint to explain our models. Yes, represent, yes, represent from a perspect point of view. But they do so by effectively delivering knowledge about what is possible concerning the object that we want to study.

32:57 Ricardo Lopes: So earlier in our conversation, you alluded to this. Uh But what are they, what are phenomena and what is the relationship between them through this framework of perspective of realism?

33:15 Michela Massimi: Yeah. So um going back to uh exactly the question of what flavor of realism is basically our realism, as I mentioned in the beginning, it's really a realism about phenomena. But I, one of the main task of the book was to redefine what I mean by phenomenon. This phenomena come from a long standing empi traditions that really stretches back to, you know, pm 19 05, a wonderful book on to save the phenomenon more recently, wasn't to Pras and I mentioned already in 1980 scientific image. Um THAT also defends the view that um you know, the reality is reality made of phenomena observable phenomena according to Tora. Um So it's very difficult to say that I'm a realist about phenomena when the very term phenomenon has been associated with uh a long standing and pis tradition that is normally regarded phenomena is not the sort of objects that one would have real and commitment to. Um So what I do in the second part of the book is trying to um articulate the positive story and the positive story is that um given this perspect of pluralism, uh where models are embedded as part of the practices of different communities, the inferences that we make are inferences to what I call moly robust phenomena. So what are moly robust phenomena? They're not the phenomena of the fro and they're not the phenomenal of Pierre do m they're not the phenomena of the Empire tradition as um faint copies or faint images of a reality uh that lies underneath the phenomenon that we need to discover uh you know, appealing to the metaphysician tools or whatever dispositional essences or because of powers uh phenomena of what there is in a way I'm um borrowing from the country and tradition, the idea that knowledge is knowledge of phenomena, but those phenomena not in pieces, phenomena more robust. And what I really mean by more of robustness is that phenomena stable event. So there's a kind of 22 tier ontology that I articulate in chapter six of the book. So phenomena are stable event index to a particular domain and they are modally robust across a plurality of data to phenomena inferences. So there are stable events in that, that there is a level of reality that are called stable event where stability is really synonymous with low likeness for me. So um stable events are events that are such not because they are core ones, but because there are low like dependencies in in the fabric of those events. So that explain why they are stable. But the phenomenon is not just a stable event. Uh The phenomenon is the outcome of an inference made by communities from data understood broadly as empirical occurrences. So to give an example that I um given the book, um it is a stable event that an electric charge is gonna be affected by an electric or magnetic field. So there are low like dependencies that explains how an electric charge is going to be deflected by an external field, that's a stable event in nature. But what we called um cathode ray or the phenomenon of the bending of cathode rays is the model robust phenomenon that uh was discovered by JJ Thompson at the end of the 19th century using a a particular tool that was a cato tube working in a particular historically cap situated context. There was the Victorian Cambridge of the end of the century. Um And, and so the phenomenon is not a robust because we can infer and Reiner um the same phenomenon from different kind of data sets by slightly tweaking the experimental conditions. Uh And and so forth. So the model of robustness is some kind of secondary property that is really a property of how different communities are able to robustly infer the same phenomenon from a variety of, of data. So that's broadly speaking, the kind of phenomena for so that I I defend in, in the book

37:54 Ricardo Lopes: and with that in mind, what are natural kinds and how do we go from phenomena to kinds?

38:04 Michela Massimi: So yeah, Um so, one of the problem I had when I was writing the book is that I was obviously committed to defending this phenomenon for so, but I was also very much aware that when it comes to realism, um it's not enough to say that we live in a world where there are moli robust phenomena, the bending of the cat race, the decay of the Higgs boson, the growth of the mycelium echolocation in Beluga. Those are examples of what I call moli robust phenomena, the pollination of flowers and so forth that require inferences on behalf of communities to stable events in nature. A realist wants uh something more than phenomena. A realist want something about natural kinds. So a realist would say, um I don't just want to know what the bending of cadore is. I want to know what the electron is. I want to know what the nucleus is. I want to know what genes are. I want to know, you know um what lemon and zebras and supernovas. Are so those are natural kinds. So those are uh kinds of things. And um again, realism very often has been associated with um number of views about what national kinds are. Um RANGING from hacking. And no, to I mentioned already, John Dupre promiscuous realism to varieties of uh uh um microstructure and essentialism back to Hillary Patnam in the 19 seventies and so forth. Um So the story I tell in the book about natural kinds, which really a long one, it stands from chapter seven to chapter 10 in the book is that natural kinds are open ended grouping of historically identified phenomena. There is nothing more, nothing over uh natural kinds than open ended grouping of historical identified phenomena. And obviously, the big challenge is OK, is this just a form of conventional, is a natural kind, just the label that we attach to grouping of phenomena. So I had to go into um quite a lot of details to clarify why the view is not a conventional view. And it's not an essentialist view either. Um But it's really a view that tries to again bring in the inferential is so phenomena, the outcome of inferences likewise natural kinds are the outcome of inferences. Um Rob robust, reliable, still revis still open ended, still very valuable inferences made by plurality of communities over time. Um And so I'll give a full definition, I give a full inferential story uh about national kind. They are called natural kinds with the human face. Borrowing from Hillary but 1990 book realism with a human face. Um What I explain how those law like dependencies in the fabric of the stable events provide effectively the um I I if you like the the kind of pointers in this walking in the garden of working path in whereby communities can make uh choices about what to cluster or what not to cluster into the natural kind. But to do so reliably, they need to rely on low like dependencies. They are part of the stable events in nature. So the clustering is not arbitrary, it is not conventional. And so there is an element of contingencies, but it's not a rampant kind of contingentism. It's, it's kind of constrained and guided by um low like dependencies in nature. So it's a long story from chapter seven to chapter 10. And I give a full detail of that in, in, in, in chapter 10 of the book where I delve into the historical case studies about the electron. And yeah, sorry.

41:59 Ricardo Lopes: No, no, no worries. Uh And another thing I would like to ask you is at a certain point in the book, you talk about contingentism. So what is contingentism and how is it involved in perspective of realism?

42:15 Michela Massimi: So continent is, is associated precisely with um with this point I was making about how the um open ended grouping of phenomena um is to some extent contingent in the sense that we could have cluster different phenomena under the National Kind Electron, for example, um now continent, this historically has been a very powerful uh argument coming from the history of science against a very strong um the physical form of realism. Um um So, I don't know lots of people that contributed to this debate from has Chang to cons for them. Also Joseph Laporte. Um SO things could have gone otherwise, right? So Joseph Laporte, in his book on Natural Con and con change, tell us it is a beautiful story of how, you know, we made a choice at some point to include the dirty oxide into um the natural kind water. But there was a choice in a way that we made, we could have, we could have gone otherwise. So that's the element of contingentism. Uh I define a particular brand of contingentism in the sense that um um um I'm not that kind of full blown contingent is in the sense that I don't think that things could have gone entirely in a completely different way. Uh Precisely because um the way I think a phenomena as a stable event where stability is synonymous with low likeness means that the inferences that communities make about what phenomena goes with. What other phenomena are not fully at our discretion, are not fully at our women in a way we need to respond to the Tribunal of Nature as a speaker, I find. So um There are a lot like dependencies that really guides those inferences that we make. Um So, uh uh and uh and so I tell a story about how um every natural kind is a kind in the making. Uh SOME of those in the making kind become empty at some point when we discovered that maybe there's some violation of fundamental laws. Uh So we believed in caloric, for example, back in the 19th century, people believed that there was a substance called caloric that was responsible for transitional state from ice to say water to, to steam. Um But some of the uh inferences that people made about what are the phenomena that are captured by the Nashua Khan Caloric uh were clearly inferences that very soon revealed their limits. So um reveal their limits because very often they were appealing to um features of the phenomena that were simply false. So, Sadiq Karno was one of the um key people in the uh formulation of the KO principles and the car cycle. So Ko believed in caloric back in the first half of the 19th century. And he believed that there was a substance that was uh uh physically conserved whenever a hot reservoir goes into cold reservoir. And then a new cycle starts behind like a steam engine. Uh BUT obviously, there is no conserve calor and there is no conservation of caloric and there is no perpetual motion machine and in fact, can be created using that principle. So this is where we face the tribunal of experience where we can't say we could have had now in 2023 an Act kind caloric still alive. And well, no, we couldn't have had that right, because we soon stumbled into some problems about some of those very phenomena that were identified, identified as the phenomenon where caloric was, was at work. And uh and the fact that there was no conservation of caloric and if anything there was dissipation, which was then captured by the concept of entropy and so forth revealed the limits of those associations. So, so kind of long winded answer to your question, the contingentism means that although things could have gone otherwise in how communities came to make inferences about phenomenon connection between phenomena, things could not have gone entirely in a completely different ways because in a way, there are those constraints concerning low like dependencies of the phenomena that uh really act as pointers in the garden of working path about which inferences we decide to go down to and which inferences we decide to abandon at some point. I

46:59 Ricardo Lopes: understand. So getting into the last part of our interview, could you tell us now about multiculturalism and cosmo cosmopolitanism? Science? I mean, uh is science a multicultural and cosmopolitan enterprise? And what role do these two things? Multiculturalism and cosmopolitan, cosmopolitanism play in science?

47:24 Michela Massimi: Yeah. No, thank you. So this is the final chapter of the book and it's um um I wanted to write that chapter because um I, I thought the book was going to be complete without a final discussion about what really um questions about realism and perspective iss uh are doing in, in this context. Um So very often in the debate on realism, philosophers have appealed to the aims of science. So it seems that, you know, we care about discussion about realism and the realism and truth and representation because we want to fundamentally um answer questions about what is the goal of science and what is the aim? Um And I thought that perspective of realism was not really answering that question about what the aim of goal of science is. Uh WHAT perspective of realism does is to um offer a different lens for thinking about realism in science, starting with this plurality of situated communities. And once you take that step, the next step is to think of questions about duties and obligations in science and rights in science. So no questions, aims and goals. But actually what is science for who produces science? Who has to benefit from science, who can reclaim as their own a right to benefit from scientific knowledge. So the first chapter in a way, try to answer those, those questions which are kind of more um ethical political questions about duties and obligations in science. So, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are again huge terms with a very long and often difficult and vexed history that I wanted to use to um exactly explain they, they called the natural perspective of realism. Though it's, there's a perspective of pluralism that like there's multiculturalism, there's this plurality of historically situated communities that over time produce reliable knowledge about more robust phenomena. But also an invitation of not thinking about that situated nature of knowledge as some kind of silo where knowledge is produced by community in isolation from other communities. Or you know, this is the um kind of picture that we had again from, you know, the the tradition of a Thomas K on scientific paradigms where there is incommensurability. Um There's a period of crisis and scientific revolution. Uh And I, I wanted to offer a different story where it was really an invitation of not to think of scientific perspectives as siloed. Uh BUT to think of those communities and their interaction in terms of what I call intersecting and interlacing scientific perspectives, perspectives that over time, not only methodological intersect to allow us to make more reliable inferences about the phenomenon that we want to study. But also over time, historically interlace like the um like in a fabric, like in a piece of cloth where you have the different threads that are historically interlaced uh to produce knowledge that effectively is knowledge that we can reclaim as, as, as knowledge that belong to all of us. And obviously that open up also the question questions about when is the interlacing virtues? When is the interlacing going badly wrong? Because there are exploitative practices or epistemic injustices in the way in which some communities appropriate other communities types of knowledge. So whose knowledge is it? Who, who can be uh uh uh attributed authorship of particular uh knowledge claims? So those are all very big questions that I try to simply really map out in the final chapter and I hope to get back to. But the idea is that starting with this perspective of pluralism and multiculturalism, we can articulate a picture about scientific knowledge as reliable knowledge uh that has to address important epistemic injustice about what I call the severing and trademarking of knowledge. And at the same time, has to result in a broader picture of how knowledge is really knowledge produced by uh uh by humankind for humankind. So that no one should be excluded from benefiting from it and benefiting from the advances of scientific knowledge. So it kind of branches out into debates about the uh right to science as a uh as a right that is enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human rights. So everyone is uh should benefit from um scientific progress and scientific advancement, but it's obviously not what happens in practice. The scientific knowledge continues to be privatized, continues to be in the hands of um few wealthy countries. So um as I said it as a final chapter that um I hope to get back to in terms of my present and future work. But it kind of shows the broader um um kind of social political dimensions in which discussions about pluralism and perspective is and realism play out.

53:03 Ricardo Lopes: And so my final question for today will be, is science really about producing objective knowledge or knowing what objective reality is?

53:18 Michela Massimi: Yes, is the answer in so far as we are clear about what we mean by objective reality, right? So uh if objective reality means that there is one way and one way only to uh carving natural disjoint, I mean, that's not what perspective of realism would subscribe to. Uh BUT by objective reality, we mean that there is a world of stable events, Koli events uh to which our uh multifarious inferential practices have to respond. That's, that's objective enough. And so, yes, scientific knowledge, knowledge of objective reality within the bounds of uh the historical and cultural situated practices that we have, we don't have any God's eye view, we don't have any view from nowhere. But that doesn't mean that what we have is just um a fragmented landscape of isolated communities. What we have is a fairly remarkable uh knowledge produced over time by different communities. And I think it's something that uh I wanted to celebrate in, in, in the book. And uh as I said, it kind of opens up broader questions about um who produces knowledge and who should benefit from knowledge that is entangled in my mind with these questions about objective reality.

54:37 Ricardo Lopes: Mhm. Great. So uh I'm leaving a link to the book in the description box of the interview, which is again, perspective of realism. Uh Doctor Massimi, just before we go, would you like to tell people where they can find you and your work on the internet?

54:54 Michela Massimi: Um So I have my website which is www dot mila mastery dot com. So, um uh um that's where my um articles and books and activities and projects normally are, are posted. Mhm.

55:14 Ricardo Lopes: Yeah. So thank you so much again for taking the time to come on the show. It's been a real pleasure to talk to you.

55:21 Michela Massimi: My pleasure. Thank you so much for having me.

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